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The sea is our very close neighbour. In fact, on the island where I live, 
Funafuti, it is possible to throw a stone from the one side of the island to the 
other. Our islands are very low-lying. When a cyclone hits us there is no place 
to escape. We cannot climb any mountains or move away to take refuge. It is 
hard to describe the effects of a cyclonic storm surge when it washes right 
across our islands. I would not want to wish this experience on anyone. The 
devastation is beyond description… This concern is so serious for our people, 
that the cabinet, in which I am a member, has been exploring the possibility 
of buying land in a nearby country, in case we become refugees to the impacts 
of climate change. 




Failing mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, the phenomenon of 
climate change is predicted to cause sea levels to rise and variable climatic 
events, such as cyclones and the ensuing storm surges, to occur with 
increasing frequency and ferocity.2 The international community has 
recognised the vulnerability of Small Island Developing States (“SIDS”) to 
such severe, adverse climatic changes and the States themselves have 
called for global assistance in building their islands’ resilience to climate 
change. Focusing upon the Small Island Developing States of the Pacific 
Region, this article considers whether efficacious adaptation is a realistic 
prospect or, alternatively, whether Pacific Islanders will be forced to leave 
their homelands in the face of such climatic ravages. If the abandonment of 
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1 Statement by the Hon Teleke P Lauti (Tuvalu) (November 2000) The Hague, Netherlands, 
COP 6 reprinted in Climate Change: Small Island Developing States, UNFCCC (2005) 13. 
2 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Third Assessment Report, ‘Climate 
Change 2001: Synthesis Report’, 15, online: <http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/reports.htm> (last 
accessed on 10 September 2006) for an accessible summary of predicted changes of 
extreme climate phenomena during the 21st century. 
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national landmasses becomes a necessity, what legal measures should be 
put in place to manage the flow of ‘climate change refugees’? 
 The case of the Small Island Developing States of the Pacific is 
considered for a number of reasons. The Pacific Islands are arguably the 
countries most at risk from climate change; they are amongst the poorest 
nations in the world; their peoples have been highly vocal in their calls for 
international assistance; and ultimately, they bear little responsibility for 
the havoc that is likely to be wreaked upon their lands.  
 Part II of this article sets out the background to the discussion by 
illustrating the vulnerability of the Pacific Islands to climate change. Part 
III considers adaptation within the context of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change3 and its Kyoto Protocol.4 In 
particular, consideration is given to the prospects of Pacific Islands 
receiving sufficient funding to prepare adaptation mechanisms and 
whether such adaptation will be achieved within an appropriate timescale. 
The possibility of an ‘Adaptation Protocol’ emerging from the climate 
change negotiations is touched upon. The fourth part of this article looks at 
the alternative to adaptation, that is, abandonment of the islands. In the 
harsh light of cost-benefit analysis, will the expense of funding adaptation 
for Small Island Developing States of the Pacific become prohibitive and 
politically unjustifiable? This article argues that the international 
community should prepare, well in advance, for the prospective 
abandonment of the Pacific Islands and other SIDS. An exploration of 
existing multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements is made to consider 
whether there is scope for abandonment to be subsumed and managed 
within an existing regime. The conclusion is in the negative. Finally, in 
part V, the article looks at whether the climate change negotiations could 
and should encompass the logistics of abandonment.     
 Certain premises have been adopted. The first is that the phenomenon 
of climate change is occurring and will escalate in the coming century. 
Secondly, it is assumed that adaptation mechanisms will prove to be costly 
and require permanent funding. Thirdly, although there is little evidence of 
                                                 
3 Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 7 November 1990, 31 
ILM (1992), 851 (entered into force 21 March 1994) (the “UNFCCC”). 
4 Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto), opened for signature 
16 March 1998, 37 ILM (1998), 22 (entered into force 16 February 2005) (the “Kyoto 
Protocol”). The UNFCCC, its Kyoto Protocol and the global negotiations taking place 
within this framework shall be hereafter referred to as the “climate change regime”.  
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mass migration as a result of climate change at present,5 this is a realistic 
possibility for the future. This article should be read with these factors in 
mind. 
 
II. THE SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES OF THE PACIFIC 
 
There are many thousands of small islands in the Pacific region. However, 
22 of those islands are recognised as ‘Small Island Developing States of 
the Asia-Pacific Region’ by the United Nations system.6 Those SIDS 
situated in the Pacific that have independent governments include Fiji, 
Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, 
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu.7 This article is concerned with this list of specified States. 
 The Pacific SIDS are extremely vulnerable to the potential effects of 
climate change.8 In the main, the islands’ terrain consists of low-lying 
coral and / or limestone and sand atolls.9 The highest point on Tuvalu, for 
example, is three metres above sea level.10 A number of the islands have 
rugged, mountainous interiors.11 The Pacific Islands are already affected 
by extreme weather events such as tropical storms, cyclones and 
hurricanes, and according to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) Secretariat, “droughts and flooding are 
also features of their weather pattern”.12 The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (“IPCC”) predicts that during the 21st century variable 
climatic events, such as cyclones, will increase in severity and frequency 
and droughts and floods associated with El Nino events will intensify.13 As 
early as 1988, academics such as Pernetta identified the extreme 
                                                 
5 See Richard Black, ‘Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality?’, UNHCR Working Paper 
Number 34 (2001), online: <http://www.unhcr.org/research/RESEARCH/3ae6a0d00.pdf> 
(last accessed on 10 September 2006). 
6 See The UN Small Island Developing States Network, ‘List of Small Island Developing 
States’, online: <http://sidsnet.org/sids_list.html> (last accessed on 10 September 2006). 
7 Ibid.   
8 Climate Change Secretariat (UNFCCC), Climate Change: Small Island Developing States 
(UNFCCC, 2005) 2, 13-23.   
9 Ibid. 
10 See UNFCCC, ‘Tuvula Initial National Communication Under the UNFCCC’ (1999), 
online: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/tuvnc1.pdf> (last accessed on 10 September 
2006). 
11 Samoa, Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. 
12 Climate Change Secretariat, above n 8, 5. 
13 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, above n 2, for an accessible summary 
of predicted changes of extreme climate phenomena during the 21st century. 
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vulnerability of the Pacific Islands to climate change and sea level rise. In 
particular, he noted that Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands and Kiribati were 
susceptible to total submersion and other islands such as Tonga, Nauru and 
the Federated States of Micronesia would suffer “major population 
displacement”.14 
 By 2001, the IPCC had projected a sea level rise of 0.09 to 0.88 of a 
metre between the years 1990 to 2100.15 Although sea level rise will vary 
across the planet, the IPCC predicted that the Pacific region, in particular, 
may experience a greater increase than the global average.16 Clearly, the 
terrain of the Pacific SIDS makes them especially vulnerable to any degree 
of sea level rise, but a rise in the region of one metre would be disastrous 
for the low-lying islands. The focus of island life centres on the coast. 
People live on the coast. The sea provides the main source of employment, 
income and food for the citizens of the Pacific SIDS and as a consequence, 
most of the infrastructure is near the coast.17 Due to the density of the 
population in many of the islands, coupled with the inhospitable, rugged 
mountainous terrain of the interiors, the prospect of moving inland is not a 
serious option.18  
 However, the Pacific SIDS are vulnerable to sea level rise not simply 
because of their particular geological features. There can be little doubt 
that an ability to adapt to the deleterious effects of climate change is a 
function of wealth, technology, information, skills and infrastructure and 
by definition, developing States lack these advantages.19 Further, a number 
of Pacific Island States are classified as ‘Least Developed Countries’ 
                                                 
14 J Pernetta, ‘Potential Impacts of Greenhouse Gas Generated Climate Change and 
Projected Sea Level Rise on Pacific Island States of the SPREP Region’ in J C Pernetta 
(ed), Projected Sea level Rise and Climate Change: A Relative Impact Rating for Countries 
in the Pacific Basin, 1–10, cited in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Special 
Report on The Regional Impacts of Climate Change: An Assessment of Vulnerability, 
(IPCC Geneva, 1997) chapter 9. 
15 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, above n 2, chapter 11.  
16 Climate Change Secretariat, above n 8, 15.   
17 Ibid 13-23. 
18 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Third assessment Report, ‘Climate 
Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’, para 17.2.2.1, online: 
<http://ipcc.ch/pub/reports.htm> (last accessed on 10 September 2006). 
19 See for example, Antonio Queface, ‘Vulnerability to the effects of extreme weather 
events in Mozambique’ (Paper presented at the UNFCCC Workshop on Adaptation, Bonn, 
18 June 2004), online: <http:/unfccc.int/files/meetings/workshops/other_meetings/ 
application/pdf.queface.pdf> (last accessed on 10 September 2006). 
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within the United Nations system.20 These are Tuvalu, Kiribati, Samoa, the 
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. It is a sorry coincidence that some of the 
islands potentially most at risk from the effects of climate change, are also 
the poorest. Accordingly, such islands will experience particular 
difficulties in preparing adaptive measures to counter climate change risks. 
In the absence of adaptive measures on the islands, adverse climatic 
conditions may cause, inter alia:21 
 
• Erosion of the coastline (if sand and coral formation is unable to 
match the rapidity of the erosion); 
• Increased flooding and storm damage in low-lying coastal areas as 
episodic storm surges and destructive waves penetrate further inland; 
• Wetland colonisation of low-lying uplands; 
• An increase in the risks to health as a result (incidents of malaria and 
cholera may proliferate); 
• Damage to agricultural systems and, as a consequence, income 
stability. ‘Coral bleaching’ also adversely effects that fish population 
within atolls; islanders depend upon fish not only for income but for 
the bulk of their protein intake; 
• Potential loss of life; 
• Difficulty in obtaining insurance. The inherent geographical 
vulnerability of the Pacific Island States, taken in conjunction with 
climate change, renders insurance unavailable or prohibitively 
expensive. As a result (and in the absence of international aid) 
natural disasters have the capacity to permanently cripple 
economies; 
• Increased salinity in aquifers and as a result, scarcity of fresh water; 
• Damage to buildings and other coastal infrastructure; 
• Potential damage to waste landfills. Pollutants in the landfill may 
migrate because of flooding and water table changes; 
                                                 
20 See UN, ‘List of Least Developed Countries’ and criteria for inclusion on the list, online: 
<http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/list.htm> (last accessed on 10 September 2006). 
21 See A U Ahmed, ‘Adaptation to Climate Change in Bangladesh: Learning by Doing’ 
(Paper presented at the UNFCCC Workshop on Adaptation, Bonn, 18 June 2004), online: 
<http:/unfccc.int/files/meetings/workshops/other_meetings/application/pdf.ahsan.pdf> (last 
accessed on 10 September 2006); J E Neumann et al, Sea Level Rise and Global Climate 
Change (Pew Centre on Global Climate Change, 2000) 3; Climate Change Secretariat, 
above n 8. 
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• An increase in the density of the population in areas of higher 
ground; this may place additional stresses on environmental 
resources; and 
• Permanent inundation. 
 
In August 2000, the United Nations held a Ministerial Conference on the 
Environment and Development in Asia and the Pacific in Japan. A 
particular focus of the Conference was the likely effects of climate change 
upon the SIDS of the Pacific. The Conference acknowledged that, failing 
effective mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, the options for the 
Pacific Islands included adaptation measures such as “foreshore 
stabilisation” but also “resettlement and migration”. The Ministers 
concluded that, “these options need planning as they have policy 
implications”.22 In light of these conclusions, it is appropriate to first 




A. Commitments to Adaptation Contained in the Framework Convention 
on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol 
 
The UNFCC encompasses a two-pronged approach to climate change: 
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and adaptation to the adverse 
effects of climate change. The UNFCCC is premised on the expectation 
that climate change will occur and that accordingly adaptation, to some 
extent, will be necessary. The ‘objectives’ of the UNFCCC, contained 
within article 2, make reference to this. The aim of the Convention is to:  
 
achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient 
to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change… 
 
Although the object of the UNFCCC is to slow down climate change to 
such an extent that adaptation can occur naturally so as to “ensure that 
food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to 
                                                 
22 See UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Ministerial 
Conference on Environment and Development in Asia and the Pacific (Kitakyushu, 31 
August-5 September 2000): ‘Forum on Climate Change and the Pacific Islands’, online: 
<http://unescap.org/mced2000/pacific/background/climate.htm> (last accessed on 10 
September 2006).   
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proceed in a sustainable manner”, it is clear that the ensuing text of the 
Convention expects parties to co-operate in implementing man-made 
adaptations to climate change. This concept of adaptation is included 
within the UNFCCC at various points, for example (my emphasis): 
 
Article 4 Commitment 
 
1. All Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and their specific national and regional development 




(b) Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where 
appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate 
change by addressing anthropogenic emissions by source and removals by 
sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal protocol, and 




(e) Co-operate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change; 
develop and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone 
management, water resources and agriculture, and for the protection and 
rehabilitation of areas, particularly in Africa, affected by drought and 
desertification, as well as floods. 
 
(f) Take climate change considerations into account, to the extent feasible, in 
their relevant social, economic and environmental policies and actions, and 
employ appropriate methods, for example impact assessments, formulated 
and determined nationally, with a view to minimising adverse effects on the 
economy, on public health and on the quality of the environment, of projects 




4. The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in 
annex II shall also assist the developing country Parties that are particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse affects of climate change in meeting the costs of 
adaptation of those adverse effects. 
 
…. 
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8. In the implementation of the commitments in this Article, the Parties 
shall give full consideration to what actions are necessary under the 
Convention, including actions related to funding, insurance and the 
transfer of technology, to meet the specific needs and concerns of 
developing country Parties arising from the adverse effects of climate 
change and / or the impact of the implementation of response measures, 
especially on: 
(a) Small island countries; 
(b) Countries with low-lying coastal areas;  
…. 
(d) Countries with areas prone to national disasters … 
…. 
Further, the Conference of the Parties may take actions as appropriate, 
with respect to this paragraph. 
 
Most of the SIDS of the Pacific meet all three of the criteria in article 4.8 
and therefore, pursuant to the UNFCCC, their adaptation needs should be 
prioritised.23  
 The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, whilst not expanding the parties’ 
commitments to adaptation, provides more specific guidance in article 
10(b)(i) in stating that “adaptation technologies and methods for improving 
spatial planning would improve adaptation to climate change”. 
 
B. The Processes and Progress of Adaptation 
 
Whilst international efforts have concentrated on developing a coherent 
legal regime for mitigation, such a regime has yet to emerge for 
adaptation.24 Progress in relation to the adaptation provisions of the 
UNFCCC has been hindered by “lack of agreement about the meaning, 
scope and timing of adaptation; limited capacity in developing countries to 
undertake vulnerability assessments and planning; and bottlenecks in the 
availability of funding”.25 Although parties to the UNFCCC were to 
develop national, regional and international adaptation mechanisms 
                                                 
23 At the date of writing (September 2005), the following Pacific SIDS were party to the 
UNFCCC: Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Niue, Samoa, Togo, Vanuatu, the Cook Islands, 
Fiji, the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Tonga, Nauru, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, 
and Vanuatu. 
24 See Ian Burton, ‘Moving Forward on Adaptation: A Big Challenge and Many 
Opportunities’ (Paper presented at the UNFCCC Adaptation Workshop, Bonn, 21 May 
2005) online: <http://www.unfccc.int> (last accessed on 10 September 2006). 
25 Farhana Yamin and Joanna Depledge, The International Climate Change Regime: A 
Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 213.   
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alongside schemes for mitigation,26 the Convention does not give any 
guidance as to timing with regards to adaptation and, of course, does not 
contain specific, mandatory provisions in this regard.   
 In 1994, a Global Conference took place in Barbados to consider the 
sustainable development of SIDS in line with Agenda 21 and the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development.27 The Conference listed 
climate change and sea level rise as an area of priority in the resulting 
Barbados Programme of Action.28 Various reviews of the Barbados 
Programme of Action have emphasised the importance of adaptation to 
climate change and rising sea levels.29 However, it was only following the 
eighth Conference of the Parties (COP) in 200230 and the adoption of the 
Marrakesh Accords31 that the importance of adaptation has been reiterated 
within the climate change regime. In particular, the COP recognised that 
greater efforts must be made to ensure the assessment of countries’ 
vulnerability to climate change. Such assessments provide the basis for 
developing adaptation methods and are therefore the necessary first stage 
in the process towards adaptation. The COP agreed that, to assist 
developing countries, a simplified methodology 32 would suffice in respect 
of national vulnerability assessments and guidance in relation to this has 
                                                 
26 As suggested by the juxtaposition of mitigation and adaptation in the text of the 
Convention. 
27 Agenda 21 is available on line at <http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/ 
agenda21/index.htm> (last accessed 7 June 2007); for the Rio Declaration see  UN General 
Assembly, Declaration of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio), UN 
Doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (1992). 
28 See UN, Report of the Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small 
Island Developing States (Bridgetown, Barbados, 1994) UN Publication E 94.I.18, online: 
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf167/aconf167-9.htm> (last accessed on 10 
September 2006).   
29 For example, see Report of the United Nations General Assembly, 22nd special sess, UN 
Doc A/S-22/2, online: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/271/89/ 
PDF/N9927189.pdf?OpenElement> (last accessed on 10 September 2006); UNGA, 
International Meeting to Review the Implementation of the Programme of Action of the 
Sustainable Development of SIDS, UN Doc A/CONF/207.L.6 (Mauritius, 10-14 January 
2005) . 
30 Conference Of the Parties, Eighth Conference report, “Part II: Action Taken”, Doc 
FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1-3 (New Delhi, 2002). 
31 Conference of the Parties, 2001, Seventh Conference, Marrakesh Accords, Doc 
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.4 Decision 28/CP.7. 
32 Ibid.  
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been incorporated into the Marrakesh Accords.33 Despite this, the 
resources and skills necessary to prepare such assessments are beyond the 
capacities of many Pacific Islands and international assistance is required.  
 The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is the entity that provides the 
financial mechanism for the UNFCCC.34 As a consequence, the GEF has 
assisted a number of developing nations, including Tuvalu, in preparing 
the initial national communication35 and is providing some assistance with 
subsequent vulnerability assessments. There are difficulties with and limits 
to GEF funding however and these are considered below. There are no 
other formal multilateral agreements for the regulated provision of 
assistance in assessing vulnerability.36 Accordingly, any additional 
international assistance is ad hoc and generally channelled, on a regional 
and bilateral level, through national donor aid programmes.  
 The Pacific SIDS have attracted a degree of international donor aid to 
assist with this process. In the main, the focus of this aid has been upon 
establishing and beginning to put into operation more effective monitoring 
mechanisms to gauge vulnerability to climate change. By way of example, 
the Australian Government, in conjunction with the Australian National 
Tidal Facility at Flinders University, sponsored the South Pacific Sea 
Level and Climate Monitoring Project in Tuvalu.37 This project installed a 
monitoring station at Funafuti in 1993 to monitor sea levels around the 
atoll. The Government of the United States of America, through the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, is also assisting by 
providing in particular “capacity building amongst meteorologists in the 
region to improve predictions and related climate change risk management 
and adaptation strategic planning”.38  
                                                 
33 Initially vulnerability assessments were to be part of the requisite “national 
communications”: see UNFCCC, 31 ILM (1992) 851, Article 4 Commitments. Following 
the Marrakesh Accords a simplified procedure has been adopted in relations to LDCs. 
Vulnerability Assessments, or NAPAs can be stand-alone documents, based on a simplified 
methodology: see Yamin and Depledge, above n 25, 237. 
34 The financial mechanism for the UNFCCC is established by article 11 of the Convention. 
35 See UNFCCC, above n 10, 2: “Acknowledgement”. 
36 Provision for bilateral or multilateral financial assistance is suggested by UNFCCC, art 
11.5.   
37 For detailed information see Flinders University, Australia, online: 
<http://www.bom.govt.au/pacificsealevel/project_info.shtml> (last accessed on 10 
September 2006). 
38 See Ambassador West, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries, 
‘Statement before the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific’ (Washington, 23 July 
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 In summary, many SIDS in the Pacific region are only at the beginning 
of the process of gathering the detailed scientific evidence required by the 
rules of the COP and have accordingly, to date, been unable to prepare any 
comprehensive vulnerability assessments.39 To reiterate, vulnerability 
assessments are only the first stage in the process for adaptation.40 In 
accordance with rules developed by the climate change regime, the 
facilitation of adequate adaptation is dependent firstly upon countries 
having completed vulnerability assessments, and secondly, having 
undertaken the requisite capacity building.41 It is concerning that some 13 
years after the adoption of the UNFCCC this first stage has still not been 
reached.  
 
C. Towards an Adaptation Protocol? 
 
Negotiations and rule development, in relation to adaptation, is continuing 
in a somewhat piecemeal fashion within the various bodies and 
mechanisms of the climate change regime. For example, the GEF is in the 
process of preparing a comprehensive adaptation strategy.42 The 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to the UNFCCC 
(SBSTA), agreed at the 18th SBSTA Conference in 2003, to add two new 
items to the agenda for consideration at SBSTA 20. One of these items 
concerned “the scientific, technical and socio-economic aspects of impacts 
of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change”.43 Importantly, at 
SBSTA 22, held in May 2005, the Subsidiary Body agreed to formulate a 
five-year plan on adaptation. To an extent, the success of this multiplicity 
of approach is hindered by the lack of an overreaching instrument to 
                                                                                                                
2003), online: <http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/2002/12159.htm> (last accessed on 10 
September 2006).  
39 UNFCCC, Review of the implementation of commitments and of other provisions of the 
Convention Financial Mechanism.  Report of the Global Environment Facility.  Note by the 
secretariat. Doc FCCC/CP/2002/4, para 13, online: <http://www.unfccc.int/documentation/ 
documents/items/3595.php#beg> (last accessed on 10 September 2006).  
40 COP 1 (1995) Decision 11/CP.1, para 1(d)(iii) available online at <http:// 
unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop1/07a01.pdf#page=34> (last accessed on 10 September 2006). 
41 For a full explanation of the processes linked to the stages of adaptation required for GEF 
funding, see Yamin and Depledge, above n 25, 236-241. 
42 COP 9 (2003) Doc FCCC/CP/2003/3 available online at  <http://unfccc.int/resource/ 
docs/cop9/03.pdf > (last accessed on 10 September 2006). 
43 UNFCCC, Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on its 
eighteenth session, held at Bonn, from 4 to 13 June 2003, available online at 
<http://www.unfccc.int/resources/docs/2003/sbsta/10.pdf> (last accessed on 10 September 
2006). 
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provide a common focus, set of definitions, baselines, principles and 
responsibilities.44  
 In light of the importance of adaptation and the potential costs 
involved, a number of experts have called for the development of an 
adaptation protocol clearly delineating the ambit of ‘adaptation’ and the 
rights and responsibilities of all parties.45 Burton, for instance, states that:46  
 
as long as adaptation remains poorly defined, and with no adequate measures 
of performance or ways of assessing progress, it cannot be expected to attract 
the serious attention of finance ministries and economic development 
agencies in any country. Do we need and what would be clear objectives for 
adaptation? Is the IPCC definition too broad or is it sufficient for your needs? 
Do we need an adaptation baseline or its equivalent? What about targets, 
funding and an Adaptation Development Mechanism, agreed measures for 
evaluation and a specific legal instrument? 
 
Whilst an adaptation protocol appears to be the only pragmatic approach, 
such a proposal has not found favour with all States parties. The delay and 
costs inherent in negotiating a new legal instrument have led SIDS to 
exercise caution over calls for an adaptation protocol.47 The concern may 
also be that to focus on adaptation will take the focus off mitigation. 
Further, it is unlikely that many developed States would wish to be tied 
into an adaptation protocol, particularly when the costs of adaptation are 
long term and as yet, unquantifiable. One of the difficulties facing 
negotiators is the fact that the range of activities that could constitute 
adaptation mechanisms is extremely wide.48 What does or does not 
constitute an adaptive mechanism is likely to prove highly contentious 
                                                 
44 Such as the Kyoto Protocol provides in relation to mitigation. 
45 See for example “A Viable Global Framework for Preventing Dangerous Climate 
Change” CAN Discussion Paper, COP 9 (Milan, December 2003); H Ott et al, “South-
North Dialogue on Equity in the Greenhouse: A Proposal for Adequate and Equitable 
Global Climate Agreement” (Eschborn, 2004); S Barrett, Environment and Statecraft: The 
Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making (Oxford University Press, 2003); Carlo C Jaeger, 
‘Climate Change: Combining Mitigation and Adaptation’ in D Michel (ed), Climate Policy 
for the 21st Century: Meeting the Long-Term Challenge of Global Warming (Centre for 
Transatlantic Relations, 2003); all summarised in D Bodansky, International Climate: 
Efforts Beyond 2012: A Survey of Approaches (Pew Centre on Global Climate Change, 
2004). 
46 Burton, above n 24, 10. 
47 Government of Tuvalu (2005) ‘Seminar of Government Experts: Draft Future Actions 
Strategy – Tuvalu’, Presentation made at the seminar of Government Experts, 16 – 17 May 
2005, Bonn, Germany (copy on file with the author). 
48 This difficulty will inform the focus for the SBSTA five-year plan: above n 43.   
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with developing States calling for a broad interpretation and developed 
States arguing for the contrary. To complicate matters further, SIDS have 
argued that the principle of adaptation contains, of necessity, two limbs.49 
The first limb pertains to building national resistance and resilience to the 
adverse effects of climate change; the second, to restoring damage.  
 
D. Adaptation Measures for Pacific SIDS 
 
In the absence of vulnerability assessments, it is difficult to categorically 
determine the type and quantum of adaptation required by Pacific SIDS. 
However, experts have suggested that adaptation measures to resist sea 
level rise, cyclones and storm surges for instance, could take the form of 
“sea walls, anti flood levees and dikes, upstream dams, beach nourishment 
and other engineering defences, plus land-use planning to deflect human 
settlements away from at risk zones” and so on.50 Simplistically, coastal 
zone management for Pacific Islands could fall into two camps.51 Firstly 
there are technological, engineered (including bio-engineered) solutions, 
such as building sea walls and anti flood levees for example. Secondly, 
there are planning or policy decisions, such as moving communities away 
from the coast and towards higher ground. There are problems inherent in 
both of these categories of solution for Pacific Island States. 
 The IPCC Third Assessment Report notes that, “in small islands where 
physical space is already scarce, adaptation measures such as retreat to 
higher ground and the use of building set-backs52 appears to have little 
practical reality”.53 In Tuvalu, for instance, the concept of moving to 
higher ground is somewhat illusory. As stated above, the highest point of 
the island is only three metres above sea level, the island’s useable 
landmass is densely populated and the vast majority of infrastructure is 
positioned around the coast.54 Thus, one of the most pragmatic solutions 
                                                 
49 See submissions made by Tuvalu on behalf of SIDS, above n 47.  
50 See N Myers, ‘Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World’ (1993) 43 
BioScience, No 11, 752, 753. 
51 Other measures, including compensatory and restorative schemes, will include “devising 
financial, administrative or legal techniques to transfer risks away from vulnerable 
communities and / or provide for collective loss sharing mechanisms”: see for example 
Yamin and Depledge, above n 25, 214. 
52 ‘Set-backs’ could include, for instance, floodplains and coastal zones. 
53 IPCC, above n 18, para 17.2.2.1.   
54 See UNFCCC, above n 10. 
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may not be available to the citizens of Tuvalu or indeed, other Pacific 
Island States. 
 The costs of employing engineering or technological solutions to the 
problem are likely to run into many billions of dollars. Although figures 
are not readily available in respect of the Pacific Islands55 one startling 
statistic, relating to Jamaica, gives some indication of the potential costs 
involved. To protect Jamaica’s coastline from the impacts of a sea level 
rise of 1 metre is projected to cost (US) $462 000 000 annually. This is 
assessed as equating to 19% of Jamaica’s Gross Domestic Product.56 
Jamaica has a coastline of 895 kilometres.57 This pales in comparison with 
the coastlines of Kiribati [1143 km], Vanuatu [2528 km] and the Solomon 
Islands [5313 km] for example.58 It is trite to state that a long-term 
commitment to major costs will be required if developing countries are to 
effectively adapt to climate change.   
 
E. Funding for Adaptation 
 
As stated above, the GEF is the entity that provides the financial 
mechanism for the climate change regime and should, therefore, provide 
funding for adaptation measures.59 Funding for the GEF is received from 
Annex II parties, that is, developed OECD member country parties to the 
UNFCCC.60 However, there is a great deal of debate within the climate 
change negotiations about funding for adaptation.61 This is hardly 
surprising given the potential costs of adaptation. Bodansky notes that 
article 4.4 of the UNFCCC is incredibly vague; it makes no reference to 
the GEF thus leaving open the question as to whether funding was to be 
                                                 
55 A criticism made by the IPCC, Third Assessment Report, ‘Climate Change 2001: 
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’ is that there has been little if any attempt to 
effectively quantify the costs of adaptation, cited in Yamin and Depledge above n 25, 216. 
56 Climate Change Secretariat, above n 8, 27. 
57 See Earthtrends Coastal and Marine Ecosystems Country Profiles, online: 
<http://earthtrends.wri.org/country_profiles/index.php?theme=1> (last accessed on 10 
September 2006)  
58 Ibid. 
59 This can be via its subsidiary mechanisms, the ‘Least Developed Countries Fund’, the 
‘Special Climate Change Fund’ and the ‘Adaptation Fund’ linked to the Kyoto Protocol’s 
Clean Development Mechanism.   
60 For a comprehensive list, see UNFCCC, Annex II Parties, online: <http://www. 
unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php> (last accessed on 10 September 2006) 
61 Yamin and Depledge, above n 25, 234. 
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via bilateral or other means, and the article uses the terminology “costs of 
adaptation” rather than the comprehensive term ‘the costs of adaptation’.62  
 The Global Environment Facility has been awarding grants in respect 
of climate change activities for 14 years, since 1991. At the date of writing 
1.8 billion (US) dollars has been provided directly through the auspices of 
the GEF and an additional amount of 9 billion dollars has been leveraged 
through co-financing from bilateral agencies, recipient countries and the 
private sector.63 These sums are to cover all climate change activities, not 
simply adaptation.64 It is interesting to compare this sum to the reported 10 
billion US dollars that the US Government assessed as required to cover 
“immediate relief needs” in the wake of Hurricane Katrina’s devastation of 
New Orleans in August 2005.65  
 It is clear that a significant increase in the donations paid into the GEF 
by developed countries will be required if developing and vulnerable 
nations, the Pacific Islands amongst them, are to adapt effectively to 
climate change. In the absence of mandatory rules governing contributions, 
how likely is it that sufficient donations will be forthcoming?66 Would it 
ever be possible to agree a mandatory level of contributions? Could other 
mechanisms to garner resources, for example the levy affiliated to the 
Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism,67 provide sufficient 
finances to fund a significant proportion of adaptation costs?68  
                                                 
62 D Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A 
Commentary’ (1993) 18(2) Yale Journal of International Law, 451-558 cited in Yamin and 
Depledge, above n 25, 234.   
63 This article was written in September 2005.  The sums available to the GEF will clearly 
change from time to time.  For the most recent budget see UNFCCC Financial Mechanism 
online at   <http://www.unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial-mechanism/items/ 
2807.php> (last accessed on 10 September 2006)  
64 By January 2005 (one year since it became operational), $34.7 million (US) had been 
specifically pledged to the Special Climate Fund, the fund that is to be used to support 
priority activities in adaptation, technology transfer and associated capacity building: see 
Climate Change Secretariat, above n 8, 9.    
65 See The Associated Press, The Guardian Newspaper, ‘Breaking News Internationally: 
Major Developments in Hurricane Katrina’ (1 September 2005), (copy on file with author). 
66 The COP and the GEF Council jointly determine the amount of funds that the GEF 
requires during each funding cycle. States pledge a sum towards that funding cycle. The 
amount that a State pledges is within the sole remit of that State: Yamin and Depledge, 
above n 25, chapter 10. 
67 Kyoto Protocol, art 12.8 states that “[t]he Conference to the Parties serving as a meeting 
of the Parties to this Protocol shall ensure that a share of the proceeds from certified project 
activities is used to cover administrative expenses as well as to assist developing country 
Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the 
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 However, even if adaptation funding is secured and engineering 
solutions adopted, it is clear that such measures do not guarantee 
protection against the worst natural disasters.69 This may become a 
particularly relevant factor in negotiations as the UNFCCC incorporates 
cost-effectiveness considerations into climate change policy. Article 3.3, 
‘Principles’, confirms one of the principles of the UNFCCC, that (my 
emphasis): 
 
[t]he Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or 
minimize the causes of climate change and to mitigate its adverse effects. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such 
measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate 
change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest 
possible cost. To achieve this, such policies and measures should take into 
account different socio-economic contexts, be comprehensive, cover all 
relevant sources, sinks, reservoirs of greenhouse gases and adaptation, and 
compromise by all economic sectors. Efforts to address climate change may 
be carried out cooperatively by interested parties. 
 
Further, decision 11/CP.1 establishes the initial guidance for the GEF and 
incorporates the requirement that adaptation strategies should be “cost-
effective”.70  
 At what point in the UNFCCC negotiations will the economics of cost-
benefit analysis intervene and subsume any progress towards adaptation 
for the Pacific Islands? Tuvalu has a population of approximately 11 000 
people, a surface area of 24 square kilometres, a comparatively lengthy 
coastline of 590 kilometres and a Gross Domestic Product of 14 000 000 
                                                                                                                
cost of adaptation”. COP 6 agreed that the levy should equate to 2% of the Certified 
Emission Reduction units received in respect of Development Mechanism projects, as 
approved at COP 7, Decision 15/CP.7, para 15, online: <http://www.unfccc.int> (last 
accessed on 10 September 2006) 
68 This is a particularly apt question, given the restrictions that have been placed on the 
levy. For example, projects hosted by LDCs do not attract a levy: COP 7, Decision 
15/CP.7, ibid.          
69 For an example, see the devastation caused to the US Gulf Coast and in particular, New 
Orleans by Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent failure of the storm surge levees, reported 
by Holbrook Mohn, ‘Katrina Devastation Called Overwhelming’ The Guardian 
Newspaper, 30 August 2005 (copy on file with the author). 
70 COP 1 (1995) Doc FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1, available online at <http://unfccc.int/ 
resources/docs/cop1/07a01.pdf#page=34> (last accessed on 10 September 2006).  
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US dollars.71 Tuvalu is entirely dependent upon external funding for 
protection from climate change. Is it likely that Pacific Islands, such as 
Tuvalu, will attract the permanent, high level of funding required to build 
resilience to climate change, especially in light of the fact that protection 
will not be guaranteed by such expenditure?    
  It is clear that the cost of funding adaptation measures is a highly 
contentious and critical issue. This fact may militate against the 
development of an adaptation protocol and may also hinder the provision 
of effective adaptation via any mechanism. What then are the alternatives 
for the people of the Pacific Islands? Will they be forced to abandon their 




A. Preliminary Note On Typology 
 
Perruchoud72 describes persons fleeing their homeland because of natural 
disasters, as ‘uprooted persons’ or ‘de facto refugees’.73 He acknowledges 
that such persons are frequently referred to as ‘environmental refugees’. 
‘Environmental refugees’ have variously been described as persons “who 
no longer gain a secure livelihood in their traditional homelands because of 
what are primarily environmental factors of unusual scope”.74  
 It is fair to say however that there are many critics of the term 
‘environmental refugees’, including William Wood, the Official 
Geographer of the United States Government.75 Critics have claimed that 
the term is “poorly defined, legally meaningless and confusing”.76 In 
                                                 
71 Statistics available from the UN for 1998, UN Food and Agricultural Organisation, 
‘Fishery Country Profile’, online: <http://www.fao.org/fi/fcp/en/TUV/profile.htm> (last 
accessed on 10 September 2006). 
72 R Perruchoud, ‘Persons falling under the Mandate of the International Organization for 
Migration, to Whom the Organization might Provide Migration Services’ (1992) 4 
International Journal of Refugee Law 205, 208. 
73 That is, persons who do not come within the strict definition of refugee as espoused by 
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951 
(entered into force 22 April 1954). For a detailed explanation see paras 4.4 hereinbelow.   
74 N Myers, J Kent, Environmental Exodus: an Emergent Crisis in the Global Arena, (The 
Climate Institute, 1995) 18 cited in Richard Black, above n 5.  
75 See William Wood ‘Eco-migration: Linkages Between Environmental Change and 
Migration’, chapter 2, Aristide R Zolberg and Peter M Benda (eds), Global Migrants, 
Global Refugees (Berghahn Books, 2001). 
76 Black, above n 5, 1  
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particular, it has been suggested that persons are rarely forced from their 
homes as a result of purely environmental factors; economic factors, 
poverty, unemployment and political and social factors usually play just as 
pivotal a role.77 These factors are highly relevant within the context of this 
article. The point at which any of the Pacific Islands might become 
uninhabitable, does not necessarily equate simply with the point of 
submergence from sea-level rise. At the eleventh COP, the Hon. Isaac 
Figir, from the Federated States of Micronesia stated:78 
 
I have no doubt that at current levels of emissions of greenhouse gases (or 
even at a lower level where there is only a nominal decrease in the level of 
emissions of greenhouse gases) submergence is a possibility. The primary 
point is, however, that a long, long time before that point is reached, our reefs 
could be dead, our fishes fleeing, our groundwater completely salinated, our 
food crops depleted and our islands made uninhabitable. 
 
Islands might become uninhabitable because they can no longer sustain the 
human population living on them. They may gradually submerge as a 
result of progressive sea level rise. A succession of abrupt climatic events 
may render the continuum of life on the islands unfeasible. At what point 
this might be reached and whether this is caused primarily by 
environmental factors and climate change or a multiplicity of economic, 
social and political causes is a matter for speculation. Suffice to say, the 
author acknowledges the complexities of the matter and avers that an 
exploration of such complexities are outside the remit of this article. For 
the purposes of this article, a wide typology has been adopted. The 
following discussion is premised on the assumption that the citizens of the 
Pacific SIDS have been forced from their homelands as a result of the 
adverse effects of climate change rendering life on the islands 
unsustainable. To facilitate the discussion, these people will be referred to 
as “climate change refugees”.      
 
B. The Prospects of Abandonment 
 
Today, there are approximately 8 000 000 people living in the South 
Pacific Islands and it is estimated that five percent of the world’s 
                                                 
77 See S Castles, ‘Environmental Change and Forced Migration: Making Sense of the 
Debate’ (October 2002) UNHCR, New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No 70, 
4-5.  
78 Hon Isaac V Figir (Federated States of Micronesia) (Berlin, 30 March), COP 11 reprinted 
in Climate Change Secretariat, above n 8, 24. 
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population live in SIDS.79 The international community has been aware of 
the risk that, through climate change, the Pacific SIDS may become 
uninhabitable, since the late 1980s at least.80 Failing mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions and in the absence of efficacious adaptation, the 
islands may eventually have to be abandoned.   
 
C. Negotiations Concerning Abandonment 
 
Of interest is the fact that the international community of sovereign States 
has not addressed the issue of abandonment, in any significant way. The 
focus within the climate change negotiations has been on mitigation and 
has turned to look in more detail at adaptation only recently. There is no 
plan of work, within the Meeting of the Parties, COPs or subsidiary bodies 
that focuses on the prospects of abandonment. There are no calls, at 
present, for a legal instrument dealing with this issue. To some extent, this 
is understandable.  
 Firstly, whilst the future prospect of mass refugee movements or 
abandonment has been raised within the climate change negotiations, 
States may not actually see this as an issue to be resolved within the 
UNFCCC. Rather, the pre-existing refugee mechanisms may be considered 
to be the appropriate fora or, in the alternative, bilateral negotiations may 
be deemed a more apt resolution. These prospects are considered below.  
 Secondly, even if States accepted that there is sufficient latitude within 
the UNFCCC to plan for and manage this future problem, it is not seen to 
be of sufficient priority at the moment. Thus far, the focus of global 
negotiations has, of necessity, been on mitigation. Obviously the source of 
the problem has to be tackled at the outset. To focus on the necessity of 
abandoning landmasses is defeatist and may well take the pressure off the 
imperative of mitigation. Invariably, the idea of losing their homeland is 
too abhorrent a concept for many to countenance. It is a solution of last 
resort. The loss of the national landmass is not simply a mere geographical 
or property loss, but may also equate to the loss of a way of life, culture, 
society and history of a people. This is particularly prescient in Pacific 
Island culture. Many Pacific nations hold the cultural belief that we are 
                                                 
79 UN Secretariat, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division, ‘World 
Statistics Pocketbook’ (2003), online: <www.un.org> (last accessed on 10 September 
2006). See Small Island Developing States Network, online: <www.sidsnet.org/ 
aosis/index.html> (last accessed on 10 September 2006).  
80 See Pernetta, above n 14, and subsequent IPCC Reports and UNFCCC Secretariat 
publications culminating in Climate Change: Small Island Developing States (2005).  
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part of the land, our forefathers are within the land and we return to our 
land.  
The “best guess” of the IPCC scientists is that sea level rise will 
become problematic for low-lying islands towards the end of this century81 
and thus, a natural response is that there is plenty of time therefore to focus 
on mitigation and adaptation rather than abandonment. Abandonment 
would be an operation of such magnitude and fraught with such difficulty 
that it is only to be considered if all else fails and there is still great 
scepticism as to whether abandonment will ever come to pass.82 In 
addition, potential recipient countries may well have pressures of their own 
in the future that militate against a commitment to take large numbers of 
migrants. Australia, for example, is likely to suffer increasing 
desertification over the coming century.83  
 Finally, there is the issue of ‘costs’. Multilateral agreements cost an 
enormous amount, not only in financial terms but also in the human 
resources and skills that are required to bring an agreement to fruition. Is 
mass migration still seen as too remote a possibility to waste time and 
resources preparing for? A slightly less tangible factor, but one of equal 
importance, is the fact that the political manoeuvring required to agree 
treaties has the potential to damage diplomatic relations and influence 
negotiations in other spheres. In addition, there may be the fear from 
developing States that developed States may reduce aid to account for 
additional formal legal commitments.  
 For all of these reasons and more, it is understandable why the prospect 
of mass migration, flowing from climate change, has not formed the basis 
for any negotiations thus far. There are however a number of factors that 
militate against this inertia.   
 The Fourth Assessment Report from the IPCC is due to be published in 
2007. At the time of publication of the Third Assessment Report (TAR) in 
2001, much of the information that premised the conclusions of that report 
was up to a decade old.84 The TAR predicted that global temperatures 
could rise between 1.4 and 5.8 degrees Celsius over this coming century.85 
                                                 
81 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, above n 15.   
82 See Black, above n 5. 
83 See M Nippert, ‘Hitting Home’ (4 December 2004) New Zealand Listener 12, 16 citing a 
report from the Australian Government.    
84 B McGuire, Climate Change 2004: Technical Paper (Benfield Hazard Research Centre, 
UCL, 2004) 8.  
85 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, above n 15. 
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It is becoming likely that the predictions of the TAR were underestimated. 
There is growing concern that the findings of the Fourth Assessment 
Report will forecast that global warming is likely to advance at a far more 
rapid rate than hitherto thought.86  
 The Pacific Islands (and other SIDS) claim that the deleterious effects 
are being felt now and point to the increasing severity of extreme weather 
events in the Pacific.87 Given the issues highlighted in part II of this article, 
what are the realistic prospects of adequate and timely funding and 
effective technological advances being in place to protect the islands? It 
may not be submergence by sea level rise (potentially a relatively distant, 
future prospect) that leads to the necessity to abandon islands. Mass 
migration may be prompted by a more abrupt turn of events. The increase 
in frequency and severity of cyclones and storm surges may make islands 
uninhabitable. The destruction caused, coupled with the inevitable 
repetition of such events, may make the prospect of Pacific Islanders 
returning to and rebuilding their homes unrealistic. 
 Resettlement of entire populations outside national boundaries has the 
potential to be extremely complicated and resource intensive. It is trite to 
say that, inevitably, this will prove culturally and socially disruptive. The 
difficulties of assimilation, present for all immigrants, will be hugely 
magnified if such mass migration is not managed in a planned, staged 
manner. Further, an emerging area of research posits that climate change, 
including the problems associated with mass migration, have the potential 
to create global security risks if pre-emptive action is not taken.88  
                                                 
86 See for example, McGuire, above n 84, 8 where he states, “recent findings suggest 
however that these figures [TAR] may represent a serious underestimate of the true level of 
global warming”. 
87 See presentation by Tuvalu, above n 47. One particular example given by Tuvalu 
concerned the extraordinary rapid succession of cyclones that battered the Cook Islands 
over a 14-day period in 2005.   
88 See for example Peter Schwatz and Doug Randall, An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario 
and its Implications for United States National Security (2003), Report commissioned by 
the United States Defence Department, online: <http://www.environmentaldefense.org/ 
documents/3566_AbruptClimateChange.pdf> (last accessed on 10 September 2006); Jon 
Barnett, ‘Security and Climate Change’ (2003) 13(1) Global Environmental Change 7; 
Robert McLeman and Barry Smit, Climate Change, Migration and Security (2004) CSIS 
Commentary Paper no 86, online: <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/publications/ 
commentary/com86.asp> (last accessed on 10 September 2006); S Oberthur et al, ‘Climate 
Change and Conflict Prevention: The Relevance for the International Process on Climate 
Change’ in Climate Change and Conflict? An Emerging Issue (2002) German Federal 
Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 113, online: 
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  The potential for large refugee flows needs to be managed and planned 
well in advance. This argument raises a number of issues but for our 
purposes the first question to ask is whether there is a pre-existing 
international legal framework or organisation that could encompass and 
manage this problem?     
 
D. Existing Multilateral Mechanisms: The Statute of the  
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
 
The Office of UNHCR was founded in 195089 to act on behalf of people 
forced from their homelands.90 The Organisation seems the logical first 
choice, to deal with any potential climate change refugees. However, 
UNCHR exists to protect one particular group of uprooted people, 
‘refugees’, and their ambit is constrained, to some extent, by the definition 
of the term ‘refugee’ in international law. Article 1 of the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, states as follows:91 
 
1. Definition of the term “Refugee” 
A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “refugee” shall apply 
to any person who:  
…. 
(2) … owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country: or 
who not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
 
                                                                                                                
<http://www.bmu.de/files/climges.pdf> (last accessed on 10 September 2006); and F 
Sindico, ‘Ex-Post and Ex-Ante [Legal] Approaches to Climate Change Threats to the 
International Community’ (2005) 9 New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law 209. 
89 GA Res 429(V), Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, UN GAOR, 5th 
sess, 325th plen mtg, UN Doc A/Res/429V (1950). 
90 The Organisation promotes international refugee agreements, monitors governments’ 
compliance with international refugee law and provides practical assistance to refugees. 
UNHCR is not a supranational organisation; it is a non-political, humanitarian organisation. 
See UNHCR website for a comprehensive explanation, online: <http://www.unhcr.ch> (last 
accessed on 10 September 2006). 
91 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, opened for signature 28 July 1951 
(entered into force 22 April 1954) (“the Refugee Convention”). See also Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees 1967, opened for signature 31 January 1967 (entered into force 4 
October 1967). 
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Might the victims of climate change induced disasters fall within the 
present Refugee Convention definition of a ‘refugee’? Should they be 
eligible to attract the same degree of legal protection and material 
assistance from the international community?  
There are arguments for and against such a proposition. The first 
difficulty relates to the fact that the Refugee Convention definition focuses 
on the cause of displacement rather than the needs of displaced persons. 
The Refugee Convention definition is wholly concerned with persons 
whose source of ‘persecution’ is human in origin and typically, although 
not always, as a result of “an act of government against an individuals”.92 
In addition, ‘refugees’ in the Refugee Convention sense, could not seek 
protection from their national government because the source of their 
persecution was invariably the State. Hence, they must turn to the 
international community for assistance. Academics have argued that 
‘refugees’ fleeing for environmental reasons, still have the protection of 
their own national government regardless of the condition of their land.93  
 Are victims of climate change suffering persecution that has a human 
origin? Would it be possible to argue that government action or inaction 
has knowingly contributed to the persecution of people by causing or 
significantly contributing to climate change?  
 It is the projected rapidity of ‘climate change’ that is the greatest 
concern to scientists (in the face of such rapid change, nature has 
insufficient time to adequately adjust to changed conditions) and it is 
widely considered that such rapidity has been induced or significantly 
contributed to by human actions.94 Governments have been aware of the 
phenomenon of climate change for two decades or more. A plethora of 
scientists have highlighted the likely effects of climate change including 
the prospects of sea level rise and the aggravating effect of rising 
                                                 
92 See A Suhrke, ‘Global Refugee Movements and Strategies of Response’ in M Kritz (ed), 
US Immigration and Refugee Policy: Global and Domestic Issues (Lexington Books, 1983) 
157, 159 and Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, (Clarendon Press, 2nd 
ed, 1996) 71-79, for the complexities of this issue and regional / State divergence of 
interpretation. Other UN Organisations are concerned with proffering humanitarian 
assistance in the face of natural disasters. 
93 For critiques of the concept of ‘environmental refugees’ see Black, above n 5, and 
Castles, above n 77. 
94 See IPCC Third Assessment Report, ‘Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report, Summary 
for Policymakers’, 4-5, online: <http://ipcc.ch/pub/reports.htm> (last accessed on 10 
September 2006).   
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temperatures on natural climatic events such as hurricanes and cyclones.95 
Thus far, governments, on a global scale, have failed to stem the increasing 
emission of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.96 However, the Pacific 
Islands’ contributions to greenhouse gas emissions are de minimis.97 Taken 
in isolation, emissions from the Pacific Islands would have little, if any, 
perceptible impact upon global climate. It would be disingenuous therefore 
to aver that the Pacific Island States’ own governments are responsible for 
the climatic ravages likely to be visited upon the islands. Would this 
prevent an argument for refugee status from succeeding?   
 Those opposed to such an argument might also add that human acts, 
such as the burning of fossil fuels and land clearance, have not, or will not, 
directly lead to Pacific Islands becoming uninhabitable. It is the adverse, 
variable climatic conditions; sea level rise, destructive cyclones, storm 
surges, that cause the damage. This adds a layer of uncertainty in relation 
to causation issues. To date, there is still difficulty within scientific 
spheres, in linking specific natural events directly to greenhouse gas 
emissions, as so many factors come into play. The IPCC Reports 
acknowledge these uncertainties.98 In the face of a traditional ‘causation’ 
approach, it may be difficult to ‘prove’ that the source of the Islanders’ 
need for refuge was of human origin.99   
 What about an alternative perspective that governments have failed to 
protect or are incapable of protecting citizens? It is possible to argue that, 
regardless of the precise causes of the persecution, national governments 
have failed or are likely to fail to protect the populace from the persecution 
of climate change. Further, international assistance will be required 
precisely because national governments have proved incapable of 
protecting their citizens from climate change.100  
                                                 
95 N Myers, Environmental Refugees (Climate Institute of Washington, 1995) 150 and 
IPCC, First Assessment Report, Second Assessment Report, Third Assessment Report, 
online: <http://ipcc.ch/pub/reports.htm> (last accessed on 10 September 2006)   
96 See Ailsa Warnock, ‘The Climate Change Regime: Efficacy, Compliance and 
Enforcement’ (2004) 8 New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law 99, 101. 
97 See Climate Change Secretariat, above n 8, 10-12. 
98 See IPCC, above n 94.  
99 As climate change science progresses this difficulty may dissipate. 
100 For a discussion as to whether citizens would become ‘stateless’ persons if their national 
landmasses were to disappear, see Vivian Markovich and David Annandale, ‘Sinking 
without a Life Jacket? Sea Level Rise and the Position of Small Island States in 
International Law’ (2000) 5(2) Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental Law 135, 147. The 
article argues to the contrary. Further, see the discussion in David Freestone, ‘International 
Law and Sea Level Rise’ in Robin Churchill and David Freestone, International Law and 
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 This is the basis for Cooper’s proposition that ‘environmental refugees’ 
and specifically ‘climate change refugees’, already come within the 
Refugee Convention definition of refugee.101 The logic of the argument is 
thus: within the international sphere, the Pacific Island governments have 
been unable to exert sufficient influence to halt increasing emissions of 
greenhouse gases. On a national level, those governments have, to date, 
achieved little in the way of adaptation measures and may experience 
difficulties in providing efficacious protection in the future.102 Would this 
perspective enable victims of climate change to come within the definition 
of refugee as espoused by the Refugee Convention? Goodwin-Gill notes 
that neither the Refugee “Convention nor the travaux preparatoires say 
much about the source of the persecution feared by the refugee and no 
necessary linkage between persecution and government authority is 
formally required” but that “the Convention does recognize the relation 
between protection and fear of prosecution. A Convention refugee, by 
definition, must be unwilling or unable to avail himself of the protection of 
the State or government.” 103  
 The concept of a government failing to protect its citizens, thereby 
triggering refugee status for its citizens, is not as straight-forward as 
Cooper’s analysis would suggest. As there is no clear guidance from the 
Refugee Convention itself, States have interpreted ‘persecution’ and the 
‘source of persecution’ in various ways.104 The issue is highly complex and 
such complexities are exacerbated by a divergence in State practice and the 
views of academic commentators.105 For example, the ‘intent’ to persecute 
may be a relevant factor. In German jurisprudence, for example, if the 
State is unwilling to provide protection, that unwillingness must be shown 
                                                                                                                
Global Climate Change (Graham & Trotman, 1991) 116, which also discounts this 
possibility. 
101 See Jessica Cooper, ‘Environmental Refugees: Meeting the Requirements of the 
Refugee Definition’ (1998) 6 New York University Environmental Law Journal 480, 522. 
102 See presentation by Tuvalu, above n 47. This is to some extent understandable given the 
relative poverty of the islands, the difficulty in accessing GEF funding, the lack of skills 
and infrastructure on the islands and limited access to technology.  
103 Goodwin-Gill, above n 92, 71-71. 
104 UNHCR has a mandate to promote refugee law, protect refugees and monitor the 
implementation of the Refugee Convention but national governments decide whether an 
applicant is a refugee in accordance with State determination procedures and national laws. 
See UNHCR website online: <http://unhcr.ch> (last accessed on 10 September 2006).   
105 Goodwin-Gill, above n 92, 69-79. Further, see Niraj Nathwani, Rethinking Refugee Law 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2003) chp 2 “Current strategies to restrict the scope of the 
refugee concept” wherein he discusses the necessity of State responsibility in persecution.   
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to be politically motivated. Arguably, in the context of climate change, 
Pacific Island governments would wish to protect their citizens but may be 
incapable of doing so. In the face of incapacity, German jurisprudence 
requires that the political motivation of the actual persecutor be taken into 
account. French practice is similarly intricate.106 When such intricacies are 
interposed into Cooper’s proposition, the difficulties become apparent. In 
relation to climate change induced ‘refugees’, how could you ever satisfy a 
test that the intentions of the greenhouse gas emitting States were 
persecutory? 
 Even if such an argument succeeded, a more discreet causal element is 
required to bring a victim of climate change within the Refugee 
Convention definition. An applicant must establish a ‘well-founded fear of 
persecution’ on one of the grounds stated. Could a person forced from their 
homeland due to the ravages of climate change claim persecution on the 
grounds of race, nationality or membership of a particular social group? 
One argument might be that Pacific Islanders are “members of a social 
group that lack the political power to protect their environment”.107 In 
addition, by virtue of their nationality, the specific geological and 
geographical characteristics of their homelands make them particularly 
susceptible to the effects of climate change.  
 However, whilst seemingly attractive, these arguments have attracted 
few academic or other supporters.108 Castles specifically rejects the idea 
that ‘environmental refugees’ fall within the present Refugee Convention 
definition.109 He opines that the term ‘environmental refugee’ could “only 
have a legal meaning in the narrow sense of people forced to flee when 
repressive forces use environmental destruction such as defoliation or 
polluting of water, as an instrument of war against a specific group”.110 
This conclusion appears to re-assert the necessity for a direct, purposeful 
link between the persecuted and the reasons for their persecution and the 
intent of the persecutor. 
 
 
                                                 
106 Gottfried Kofner and Peter Nicolaus von M Grünewald, Grundlagen des Asylrechts in 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Unbekannter Einband, 1986) 436-40 cited in Goodman-
Gill, above n 92, 73.  
107 See Cooper, above n 101. 
108 See Markovich and Annandale, above n 100, 151.   
109 Although his paper did not specifically concern people fleeing from climate change 
induced disasters.   
110 Castles, above n 77, 8.   
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1. Is There any Prospect that the Text of the Refugee Convention Might be 
Expanded to Encompass a Broader Definition of ‘Refugee’? 
 
Commentators have considered whether the definition of ‘refugee’ in the 
Refugee Convention should be expanded and in particular, expanded along 
human rights lines. The Refugee Convention has its foundations in 
concepts of human rights and human rights law and indeed the preamble 
cites the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights111 and the principle 
that “human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms”. In 
addition, the Refugee Convention reinforces the concept of freedom from 
persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group and political opinion. Such rights are mirrored in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.112 Accordingly, commentators 
have argued that the Refugee Convention is imbued with notions of human 
rights. Cooper notes however that the Refugee Convention omitted to 
include the broader economic and social rights contained within the 
Universal Declaration113 and further, that, the Refugee Convention has 
failed to keep pace with the rapid development in human rights law over 
the last half century. This, she argues, is incongruous and suggests that a 
broader definition would allow ‘environmental refugees’ to come within 
the protection of the Refugee Convention. Cooper suggests a textual 
formula that would read:114 
 
any person who (1) owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, 
or political opinion, or (2) degraded environmental conditions threatening his 
life, health, means of subsistence, or use of natural resources, is outside his 
country… etc. 
 
Although it appears that she is arguing that the “reasons for” part of the 
definition should be emasculated, the necessity of the ‘causal’ element be 
                                                 
111 GA Res 217 (III)A, International Bill of Human Rights: “Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights”, UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 (1948). Though note 
Nathwani, above n 105, 18-19, where he comments that the preamble only asserts that 
refugees should be afforded human rights protection in the recipient country and “the 
Convention does not state that a human rights violation is a condition for refugee status”. 
112 See ibid, arts 2 and 18-20.   
113 See Cooper, above n 101, 492, specifically rights contained within articles 3, 22 and 25. 
For the reasons for this limitation (which is founded on States’ desires to limit the numbers 
of potential refugees), see Goodwin-Gill, above n 92, chp 1 “Definition and Description” 
and in particular pages 4-20. 
114 Cooper, above n 101, 494.   
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removed, this is incorrect. Following her argument, the concept of 
“degraded environmental conditions” is a discriminatory factor based on 
the specific identity or characteristics of the persecuted and thus this 
reinforces the causal (as opposed to needs) focus of the Refugee 
Convention. Cooper does however acknowledge that such a proposal is 
unlikely to meet with political acceptance and this is inevitably correct.115  
 There may be valid arguments against an expansion of the refugee 
definition. Nathwani fears that refugee law will loose its theoretical 
neutrality if the concept of human rights violations is explicitly imported 
into the Convention.116 Human rights violations, by definition, create 
opprobrium. For a State to acknowledge the human rights violations of 
another State will incur particular diplomatic difficulties. This may lead to 
unwillingness on the part of the recipient State to accept applicants as 
refugees in this context.117 In addition, a wider definition will create 
greater numbers of refugees. This directly contradicts the desire of 
developed States to limit the numbers of eligible refugees seeking asylum. 
Nathwani posits that this will create the need for developed States to 
determine a “hierarchy of human rights” which is ultimately contentious 
and undesirable in the context of refugee law.118    
 In summary, for the reasons stated above amongst others, it is highly 
unlikely that a textual expansion of the Refugee Convention definition of 
‘a refugee’ will come into existence in the near future.  
 
2. Might the Victims of Climate Change Induced Disasters Fall Within a 
Broader Definition of Refugees that is Emerging in Customary 
International Law? 119 
 
Treaty law is not of course the only source of international law. Custom 
can crystallise into international law.120 Is a broader definition of ‘a 
refugee’ emerging in international law? Goodwin-Gill avers that although 
                                                 
115 Cooper, ibid 495 and see Castles, above n 77, 10, outlining the present political 
opposition to expanding the numbers of persons falling within the definition of a refugee.  
116 Nathwani, above n 105, 17-26.  
117 Ibid 21. 
118 Ibid 22-23. 
119 The concept of an emerging customary law is posited by James C Hathaway, The Law of 
Refugee Status (Butterworths, 1991) 16-21. 
120 See article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 
opened for signature 26 June 1945, 39 AJIL (entered into force 24 October 1945) for the 
application of customary law: “The Court… shall apply (b) international custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law”.   
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States are not willing to counter any expansion of the Refugee Convention 
definition of refugees, State practice “commonly reflects recognition of the 
protection needs and entitlements of a broader class”.121 This assertion is 
supported by Hathaway’s view that “there is a virtual unanimity of State 
practice in affording some type of protection to refugees outside the formal 
scope of the Convention”.122 In addition, two regional agreements have 
explicitly expanded the definition of a ‘refugee’ from the constrained 
version encapsulated in the Refugee Convention. The 1974 Organisation 
of African Unity Convention123 states at article 1(2) that: 
 
[t]he term refugee shall apply to every person who owing to external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing the 
public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin, or nationality, 
is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in 
another place outside his country of origin or nationality.    
 
It is arguable that the phrase events seriously disturbing the public order is 
particularly apposite and referable to climate change induced 
environmental disasters. 
 In 1984, ten Central American States adopted the Cartagena 
Declaration on Refugees.124 Conclusion III.3 declared that: 
 
[t]he definition or concept of a refugee to be recommended for use in the 
region, is one which, in addition to containing the elements of the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol, includes among refugees persons who 
have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been 
threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, 
massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have 
seriously disturbed public order. 
 
There is an emerging interrelationship between human rights law and 
environmental advocacy. A growing jurisprudence recognises and enforces 
substantive human rights linked to environmental protection, principally 
the right to life, health, culture, peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions 
                                                 
121 Goodwin-Gill, above n 92, 79. For an apposite example, see the policy adopted by 
Australia described herein below. 
122 Hathaway, above n 119, 22. 
123 Organisation of African Unity, Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa, opened for signature 10 September 1969, 1001 UNTS 45 (entered into 
force 20 June 1974). 
124 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, opened for signature 22 November 1984, 
OAS/Ser.L./V/II.66.doc.10, rev 1. 
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and the right to respect for one’s private life and home.125 The Cartagena 
definition of a refugee, that includes freedom from persecution of massive 
human rights violations, would arguably cover persons that had to abandon 
their homes due to the most severe, adverse effects of climate change. 
Victims of climate change may have lost their homes, property and means 
of subsistence. Their health and lives may be threatened by the 
environmental devastation.     
 Despite the foregoing, it is unlikely that an expanded definition of 
‘refugee’ has emerged, fully formed as international customary law. What 
would that definition be? It incredibly difficult to determine when custom 
becomes law but arguably both evidence of State practice and opinio iuris 
are required.126 As Birnie and Boyle note:127 
 
both conduct and conviction on the part of the state are required before it can 
be said that a custom has become law… it is increasingly difficult, in a world 
of over 190 states of diverse cultures, policies, interests and legal systems to 
identify universal practice… deciding what has become customary law 
involves examination not only of states’ authoritative statements, unilateral 
and multilateral declarations, legislation and other acts, court decisions and 
actions in international organizations relevant to particular issues, but also 
their policies and conduct in the numerous other international bodies. 
 
Ultimately, a State must consent either explicitly or by implication, to the 
creation of new customary law.128 Even the enactment of legislation is not 
conclusive proof that a State so consents; any such expanded definition 
must be applied and enforced by the State. In addition, a State may have 
                                                 
125 D Shelton, “Environmental Jurisprudence of International Human Rights Tribunals” in 
Romina Picolotti and Jorge Taillant (eds), Linking Human Rights and Environment 
(University of Arizona Press, 2003). The United Nations Human Rights Committee, the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the European Commission and the Court of 
Human Rights, the European Court of Justice and the African Commission on Human 
Rights have all enforced human rights linked with environmental protection.    
126 See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 5th 
ed, 1998) 7. Further, the ICJ has, in a number of decisions, stated that opinio iuris should be 
seen as having equal importance with State practice. For examples, see Case Concerning 
the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta) (Judgment) [1985] ICJ Rep, 13 
and Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons 
in Armed Conflict [1996] ICJ Rep, 226.  
127 Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle, International Law and the Environment (Oxford 
University Press, 2nd ed, 2002) 16.   
128 Ibid. 
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persistently objected to the norm creation.129 It is unlikely that consensus 
would be reached that a new norm of customary international refugee law 




Individual States, or specific regions in the case of Central America and 
Africa, may well be prepared to accommodate climate change refugees but 
there is no global homogeneity in relation to the approach to be adopted. In 
order to deal effectively, efficiently and fairly with climate change 
refugees, a global agreement is to be preferred. In addition, such an 
agreement should provide pre-planning for the staged removal of refugees 
so as to facilitate the integration of potentially large numbers of persons 
into a new society with the least amount of disruption. By definition, a 
Refugee Convention refugee must already be outside his or her country of 
origin130 and this threshold requirement means that existing refugee law 
may not be the best vehicle for managing peoples displaced by climate 
change.   
 To summarise, it is highly unlikely that the Refugee Convention could 
be used as a vehicle to globally plan and manage a migration from the 
Pacific Islands as a result of climate change. There has not been any 
significant re-negotiation of the Refugee Convention for the last half-
century. It is, as far as many States are concerned, a fully formed treaty 
that is not open for re-negotiation. In the present political climate, it is 
unlikely that any consensus would be reached, that the Refugee 
Convention could or should be used to encompass plans for a mass 
migration premised on climate change.   
 The UNHCR acknowledges that there are similarities between 
‘traditional refugees’ and ‘environmental refugees’ including the forced 
nature of their flight and their need for material assistance and permission 
to live in foreign States. In addition, UNHCR accepts that ‘environmental 
refugees’ need assistance but questions what organisation and / or legal 
                                                 
129 In order to avoid being bound by an emerging rule of customary international law, a 
State must clearly and consistently indicate that it does not wish to be bound. For a 
discussion of the ‘persistent objector’ concept see Donald Anton, Penelope Mathew and 
Wayne Morgan, International Law: Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press, 2005) 
228; Brownlie, above n 126, 10. Further, see Asylum Case (Columbia v Peru) [1950] ICJ 
Rep, 277 and Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v Norway) [1951] ICJ Rep, 131.   
130 Goodwin-Gill, above n 92, 40. 
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mechanism would be the most appropriate conduit for help.131 In all the 
circumstances, it appears that a new treaty, potentially encompassing 
displaced person in general, would be required to manage the problem of 
climate change refugees. 
 
E. Existing Bilateral Agreements 
 
As stated above, a global agreement on managing climate change refugees 
is to be preferred. However, as a precursor to a global agreement, it may be 
of value to consider whether there are any existing bilateral agreements 
that recognise the potential for flows of climate change refugees.  
 In 2000, Ionata Ionata, the Prime Minister of Tuvalu called upon States 
to consider offering permanent residency status to Tuvaluan citizens forced 
to leave their homelands as a result of climate change and sea level rise.132 
One academic, writing in 2003, posited that it is “incumbent on Australia, 
New Zealand and the United States to prepare for greater numbers of 
Pacific Island immigrants as these countries are capable of accommodating 
larger numbers of people, they already have substantial populations of 
Pacific Islanders, and they are in no small way responsible for climate 
change”.133 Whilst a comprehensive analysis of the immigration policies in 
respect to the Pacific Islands of all States is beyond the scope of this paper, 
an analysis of the approach taken by those three specified States is 
achievable. Accordingly, have New Zealand, Australia and /or the United 
States of America made any special provision to date, for immigrants from 
the Pacific Islands? If so, is such preferential treatment founded in the 
Pacific Islanders’ claims that they are already suffering the adverse effects 
of climate change?134   
 
1. New Zealand135 
 
Following Tuvalu’s plea, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in New Zealand, 
Phil Goff, asserted in a media interview that whilst sea-level rise, thus far, 
did not endanger the Islands “if the Islands were to become uninhabitable, 
                                                 
131 UNHCR , ‘The Environment: A Critical Time’ (2002) 2(127) Refugees 12 – 13. 
132 J Barnett, ‘Security and Climate Change’ (2003) 1 Global Environmental Change 7, 12.    
133 Ibid.  
134 See submissions made by Tuvalu on behalf of the Small Island States to the Seminar of 
Government Experts, above n 47. 
135 The Legislation governing immigration and refugee status in New Zealand is the 
Immigration Act 1987 (NZ). 
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then of course New Zealand, Australia, the Pacific and other countries 
would come to their assistance”.136 Goff suggested that New Zealand “may 
look at a [permanent residency] scheme for Tuvaluans but on a [sic] fairly 
restricted figures. You’re talking about double figures, not four figures, on 
an annual basis”. On 1 July 2001, the New Zealand Immigration 
Department introduced the Pacific Island Access Category. Pursuant to 
this scheme, a preferential quota was established for immigrants from 
Tonga, Tuvalu and Kiribati seeking to reside in New Zealand. On the 
proviso that they met basic character requirements, each year 250 
immigrants from Tonga, 75 from Tuvalu and 50 from Kiribati were to be 
afforded permanent residency status in New Zealand. The quota was to be 
conducted by ballot. In a statement tabled to announce the scheme, Goff 
succinctly stated that, “the scheme will assist these small nations”.137 At a 
later date, the scheme was extended to encompass Fijian nationals.  
 There is no suggestion in the government statements that accompanied 
the introduction of the Pacific Island Access Category, that the scheme 
flowed from a necessity to heed any environmental pressures the islanders 
were exposed to, nor any suggestion that this was part of a progressive 
assimilation of the islanders into New Zealand society to ‘ease the passing 
of the states’. The notes, accompanying the explanation of the scheme, 
state that Pacific Islanders wish to move to New Zealand for “work 
opportunities, education and family reasons” and the specified islands 
were former protectorates.138 Accordingly, it is difficult to ascertain the 
primary reasons for the scheme. Whilst the practical effects of this scheme 
could be considered to be a gradual migration of the islands’ populations 
to New Zealand, in the absence of a clear policy statement, it would be 
inappropriate to assert that New Zealand has accepted the concept of 
Pacific Island environmental migrants or refugees. There is no suggestion 
that New Zealand (in isolation) has accepted the eventual demise of these 
Pacific Island States and wishes to manage this catastrophe and politically, 
how could there be? Such a scheme is, of course, in any event, susceptible 
to the policy objectives accompanying a change of government. The 
                                                 
136 Phil Goff, Minister for Foreign Affairs, New Zealand (21 June 2000) Reuters News 
Service, online: <www.heatisonline.org> (last accessed on 10 September 2006). 
137 See the statement by the Hon Lianne Dalziel, Minister for Immigration and the Hon Phil 
Goff, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ‘Government Announces Pacific Island Access Scheme’ 
(20 December 2001) online: <www.beehive.govt.nz> (last accessed on 10 September 
2006). 
138 See New Zealand Department of Immigration, Homepage, online: <http:/immigration. 
govt.nz/migrant/stream/live/pacificaccess> (last accessed on 10 September 2006). 
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Australia does not have a separate migrant quota allocation for Pacific 
Islanders. However, there is an annual allocated quota of 13 000 places for 
those seeking ‘humanitarian assistance’ or refugees channelled through the 
UNHCR.140 To qualify for ‘humanitarian assistance’, any applicant must 
show that they have been subject to “substantial discrimination amounting 
to a gross violation of human rights within their own country”.141 In 
addition, such an applicant must be “proposed” or sponsored by an 
Australian citizen or qualifying organisation. Although the use of a human 
rights based approach is interesting,142 the definition of those seeking 
‘humanitarian assistance’ is narrowly drafted. Would Pacific Islanders 
suffering the deleterious effects of climate change come within it? 
Potentially, the necessity for an applicant to have suffered ‘substantial 
discrimination’ militates against that. Climate change, in the form of sea 
level rise or cyclones, will not discriminate between individual islanders.   
 An interesting development is taking place, however. Media reports 
assert that the Government of Nauru is “presently in negotiations with the 
Australian Government to relocate it’s entire population”.143 Nauru is 
suffering from a combination of severe economic and environmental 
problems and these difficulties have proven to be a catalyst for 
negotiations.144 The State has exhausted the phosphate reserves that 
provided the main source of income for the population. As a result of 
decades of intensive mining, Nauru is suffering from chronic 
                                                 
139 The legislation governing immigration and refugee status in Australia is the Migration 
Act 1958 (AU). 
140 See the website for The Australian Government Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, online <http://www.immi.gov.au> (last accessed on 
10 September 2006). 
141 See the website for The Australian Government Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, online <http://www.immi.gov.au/refugee/ 
migrating_refugee.htm> (last accessed on 10 September 2006). 
142 See discussion above. 
143 See M Nippert, ‘Hitting Home’ (4 December 2004) New Zealand Listener 12, 17.   
144 See K Seneviratne, ‘Nauru Turns to Dust’ (26 May 1999) The Asia Times, (copy on file 
with the author) and for a wider exploration of the problem see Christopher G 
Weeramantry, Nauru: Environmental Damage under International Trusteeship, (Oxford 
University Press, 1992). 
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environmental degradation. Eighty percent of the landmass is unusable and 
the State is wholly dependent on imports for survival. Having squandered, 
through inefficiency and corruption, a financial settlement worth in the 
region of 90 million dollars,145 Nauru does not have the financial resources 
necessary to restore ecological balance.146 In the event that an agreement is 
reached to transpose the entire Nauru population, an interesting precedent 
may be set for the purposes of climate change refugees.   
 
3. The United States of America147 
 
The United States of American has a number of programmes designed to 
help those who have been forcibly removed from their homeland.148 Each 
year a quota is set, specifying the number of places available to ‘refugees’. 
For 2005, 70 000 places were allocated for refugees. The US Government 
applies the definition provided in the 1951 Convention to the term 
‘refugee’.149  
 The Attorney General of the US also has the power to allocate 
‘humanitarian parole’, on a case-by-case basis, to deserving applicants. 
This is a temporary scheme that enables those in urgent humanitarian need 
to remain in the US for up to one year. This provision is only to be used in 
the most “exceptional” cases.150   
                                                 
145 In 1989, Nauru lodged a claim with the International Court of Justice in The Hague 
against Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom to seek compensation for the 
phosphate extracted by those countries. The matter was settled out of Court in 1993. See 
BBC News, ‘Timeline: Nauru’, online: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-
pacific/1134774.stm> (last accessed on 10 September 2006). 
146 It is anticipated that US$210 million is required and the work would take 20 years to 
complete: see Seneviratne, above n 144. 
147 The legislation governing the US national regulation of refugees is the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (US), 8 USC 1101 et seq (2003) and the Refugee Act 1980 (US). 
148 See The United States of America Department of Homeland Security, Citizenship and 
Immigration Service, Homepage, online: <http://uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis> (last accessed 
on 10 September 2006). 
149 See The United States of America Department of Homeland Security, Citizenship and 
Immigration Service online at  <http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem. 
eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=c9b4ef4c766fd010VgnVCM1000000ec
d190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=c9b4ef4c766fd010VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD>  (last 
accessed 10 September 2006).  
150 See The United States of America Department of Homeland Security, Citizenship and 
Immigration Service online at <http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem. 
5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=b04596981298d010VgnVCM10000048f
3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=828807b03d92b010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD > (last 
accessed 10 September 2006). 
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 The ‘Temporary Protected Status Programme’ grants temporary 
immigration status to eligible nationals of designated countries. Countries 
that are in the grip of armed conflict, are suffering the temporary effects of 
an environmental disaster or other extraordinary conditions are specified 
and listed on the Programme. Nationals of those States that meet basic 
character requirements, will be entitled to remain in the US for a period 
that correlates to the length of time that their country of origin is so 
designated.151   
 There is no specific immigration quota for Pacific Islanders. It is clear 
that the US immigration framework has, in theory, the necessary flexibility 
to take account of an abrupt environmental catastrophe but there are no 
programmes that provide for a planned, staged migration from the Pacific 
Islands (nor indeed from any other SIDS that are at specific risk from 




New Zealand, Australia and the US are amongst the developed nation 
States most readily affiliated with the Pacific Islands. There is little, if any 
evidence that these nations have accepted the need to make special 
provision for accommodating a gradual flow of refugees from the Pacific 
SIDS on the basis of climate change grounds.   
 
V. DEALING WITH CLIMATE CHANGE REFUGEES WITHIN  
THE CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 
 
Would it be appropriate to commence negotiations for an agreement 
relating to climate change refugees within the auspices of the climate 
change regime and specifically within negotiations focussing upon 
‘adaptation’? Is the concept of ‘adaptation’ wide enough to encompass 
such discussions? 
 The definition of ‘adaptation’ is not included in the article 1 list of 
‘Definitions’ of the UNFCCC. 152 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention 
                                                 
151 See The United States of America Department of Homeland Security, Citizenship and 
Immigration Service online at <http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem. 
eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=609d3591ec04d010VgnVCM10000048f
3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=609d3591ec04d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD>  (last 
accessed 10 September 2006). 
152 The IPCC defines adaptation as adjustments in practices, processes, or structure which 
can moderate or offset the potential for damage or take advantage of opportunities created 
by a given change in climate, see IPCC, Third Assessment Report, ‘Climate Change  2001: 
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on the Law of Treaties states that a treaty shall “be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in the context and in light of its object and purpose”.153 The 
ordinary use and meaning of ‘adapt’ or ‘adaptation to’ includes to “become 
adjusted to new conditions”.154 Looked at within the context of the treaty 
text alone, it is arguable that a broad meaning has been given to the 
concept of ‘adaptation’.155 By way of example, article 4.8 suggests that 
States take a ‘broad-brush’ approach in their methods to assist developing 
countries in responding to the effects of climate change. Specifically the 
article states that Parties shall give “full consideration to what actions are 
necessary… to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing country 
Parties”. The Article continues with a non-exhaustive list of potential 
assistance “including actions related to funding, insurance and the transfer 
of technology”. The Conference of the Parties is given a mandate to take 
such action as “appropriate with respect to this paragraph”. This article is 
widely drafted (as is appropriate in a Framework Treaty); there is clearly 
scope for negotiations of an ‘Adaptation Protocol’. Given the leeway 
afforded in the text of the UNFCCC, negotiations could, in theory, 
consider the necessity of eventual abandonment and planned migration 
policies. The text would not prevent this, only the political will of the 
Parties.     
 States opposed to incorporating negotiations on climate change 
refugees within the climate change regime may assert that, in principle, the 
UNFCCC is not the appropriate forum and that the existing refugee law 
mechanisms should wrestle with the issue. As discussed above however, 
the existing international agreement relating to refugees would not provide 
for climate change refugees and there is no active, ongoing process of re-
negotiation that exists in relation to the Refugee Convention. It would be 
most unlikely that climate change refugees would provide the impetus to 
re-open the definition of a refugee and the concepts contained within the 
Refugee Convention. Why should the tragedy of people forced from their 
                                                                                                                
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’, online at <http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/reports.htm> 
(last accessed 10 September 2006).   
153 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 
UNTS 3311, 8 ILM 689 (entered into force 27 January 1980).    
154 See D Thompson (ed), The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Modern English (Clarendon 
Press, 1995). 
155 Yamin and Depledge suggest that it is the very breadth of the term ‘adaptation’ that has 
hindered agreement by “presenting problems as far as the prioritisation of resources is 
concerned”: Yamin and Depledge, above n 25, 215. 
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home by climate change (a discreet causal element) force a reconsideration 
of refugee law when the need to assist internally displaced persons, the 
stateless, economic migrants and other environmental refugees, has not 
provided sufficient impetus? To ‘open the door’ of refugee law to the 
victims of climate change will invariably lead to ‘floodgates’ arguments. 
Opponents may claim that the refugee system will become swamped and 
unmanageable and that the rights and needs of ‘traditional’ refugees will 
be lost in the melee.  
 There will invariably be opposition to the very concept of a ‘climate 
change refugee’. It may be extremely difficult to provide a precise 
definition for this term. The case of submerged Pacific Islanders fits easily 
into the concept but what of other persons who, as Isaac V Figir suggests, 
have been deprived of their means of subsistence by climate change?156 At 
what point does a person become a refugee to climate change? How do 
you draw the line between economic migrants and so-called climate 
change refugees? The concept of a climate change refugee is premised 
upon a mono-causality that in reality seldom exists. The effects of climate 
change will be magnified for developing nations because of over 
population, unsustainable development practices, inefficient politicians, 
poverty, lack of infrastructure, technology and so on. Will climate change 
need to be the pre-eminent or a significant factor in the flight of persons 
from their homelands? How will this be assessed and measured? Should an 
agreement be premised on a ‘needs’ or ‘causal’ basis? Would an 
agreement based on the needs of the refugees, be too wide and 
unmanageable? Will scientific developments reach such an advanced level 
that causation for climate change and the precise effects of greenhouse gas 
emissions into the atmosphere cease to be contentious issues?   
 Delineating definitions proves a difficulty whenever legal instruments 
are drafted but such difficulties are generally surmountable. Assuming that 
this will be the case in the context of ‘climate change refugees’, there are 
clear arguments in favour of incorporating plans for abandonment within 
the negotiations on adaptation. Firstly, abandonment is the obvious fall 
back position in the event of mitigation and adaptation ultimately failing. 
Accordingly, on that basis, the climate change regime is an appropriate 
forum. A cynical view may be that, sadly, abandonment is ultimately the 
most realistic prospect for many Pacific Islands. Protecting the islands 
                                                 
156 Hon Isaac V Figir (Federated States of Micronesia) 30 March, Berlin, Germany, COP 11 
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from climate change may prove impossible and / or prohibitively 
expensive and as a result ‘politically unjustifiable’ for foreign States 
funding the adaptation. How is a price to be put on the value of the 
islanders preserving their homelands, way of life, culture and society? Will 
these factors be taken into account in calculations assessing whether 
adaptation of the islands meets the ‘cost-effective’ criteria of the 
UNFCCC? Of course, one hopes that these arguments, unpalatable as they 
are, will not dictate the fate of the Pacific Islanders. Unfortunately, the 
reluctance to ‘sacrifice’ economic development in order to mitigate 
greenhouse gas emissions that colours the climate change debate in many 
States does not bode well for such hopes.     
 Secondly, the climate change regime could, in theory, prove efficient in 
determining an efficacious protocol concerning abandonment. The 
ongoing UNFCCC negotiations concern practically all States and have 
recently turned to focus on adaptation in all its guises. A massive 
international effort exists to formulate, inter alia, legal responses to climate 
change so the resources, skills and potentially, the willingness to address 
this issue,157 are all present within the climate change regime.   
 Thirdly, if abandonment is to become a realistic prospect, the 
international community needs to start to grapple with the issue now. The 
machinery needs to be in place before any crisis occurs, as any migration 
would need to be carefully staged and planned to avoid the difficulties 
identified in paragraph 5.3.8 above. Multilateral negotiations take years if 
not decades. The requisite UN bureaucracy builds delay into the system 
and agreements are slow in the making as nation States are reluctant to 
commit resources to a problem or to make commitments that might 
sacrifice a degree of national sovereignty. Many issues come to the fore 
that inevitably will lead to heated negotiation and potentially, highly 
detailed provisions. For example, there will be a need for the burden of 
mass migration to be shared equitably between potential recipient States. 
How will this be achieved? Will it be based upon the needs of the climate 
change refugees; on geographical closeness; on social similarities between 
donor and host; on the resource abilities of the host; on a ‘compensatory’, 
‘polluter pays’ basis? Will monetary compensation accompany the 
refugees who have lost their homeland and if so who will pay? Such 
                                                 
157 Again, a highly cynical view may be that compared to the costs of adaptation, 
abandonment may be the lesser of the financial evils and therefore a slightly more attractive 
option for developed States. However, given the anti-immigrant rhetoric conveyed by parts 
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potentially complex ‘formulae’ or criteria need to be worked out in 
advance. In addition, the potential loss of an entire nation raises particular 
issues within the context of international law. Will the nation State still 
exist in the absence of its land-based territory? Could a State exist as a 
separate entity within the land borders of another State? What would 
become of the submerged States’ territorial waters and exclusive economic 
zone?158 Rather than establishing a completely separate set of negotiations 
under, for example, the auspices of the UNHCR, which will increase delay 




In light of the conclusions of the IPCC, the reluctance or inability of States 
to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases is a cause for great concern.159 
This article has attempted to consider the fate of the Pacific Islands in the 
face of escalating climate change. Adaptation to climate change is proving 
to be a tortuously slow process and may ultimately prove to be ineffective 
and / or unfeasibly expensive. The prospects of the Pacific Islands, and 
other SIDS, being abandoned and the islanders loosing their homelands 
must be considered a realistic future prospect. The international 
community of sovereign States appears to be ill equipped to deal with the 
prospect of a mass migration of climate change refugees and any global 
agreement in relation to this issue can be expected to be fraught with 
difficulty. When the options are considered, it is clear that consideration of 
the alternatives all point to the fact that renewed efforts must be made to 
mitigate greenhouse gas emissions in an attempt to halt the advance of 
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